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Abstract 
 
 
We assess the impact that Colombia’s 1993 health sector reform had on the enrollment of 
self-employed workers in mandatory social health insurance scheme, with a especial focus on the 
independent contractors. This group grew dramatically in the form of workers cooperatives 
between 1993 and 2003, becoming a source of self-employed evasion and a way to disguised 
employment. We use two national-level Living Standards Measurement Surveys conducted in 
Colombia in 1997 and 2003, and follow a methodology that corrects for sample selection, 
decomposing health insurance coverage variation into changes attributed to the reform and to the 
characteristics of independent contractors. We find that: (i) Between 1997 and 2003, enrollment 
increased in 28 percentage points reaching an insurance rate of 62%, still below the reform goal 
of 80%, (ii) enrollment of independent contractors in 1997 was only 35% (compared to 50%) 
after adjusting by the selection bias due to disguised employment, (ii) the new legislation and 
stringent monitoring implemented in 2003 to cope with evasion seem to be effective since the 
sample selection due to disguised employment was not statistically significant in 2003. 
Addressing the interaction of the labor market with the health reform, as well as, accounting for 
the heterogeneity within the self-employed group are the main contributions of this paper to the 
literature on health insurance reforms in developing countries.  
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1. Introduction 
Self-employed
1
 workers constitute a large and increasing part of the labor force in most 
developing countries (ILO, 2005a). In Latin America, they accounted for between 25% and 
46.6% of the worker population in 2000 while, in Colombia, they made up approximately 38.5% 
of the labor force that year (Maloney and Nuñez, 2003; Tannuri-Pianto et al., 2004; Gindling and 
Terrell, 2004). However, health insurance among the self-employed is low, which is a matter of 
concern for governments because it leads to worse health outcomes (Levy, 2002; Institute of 
Medicine, 2002), and, threatens the financial sustainability of the healthcare system as well as 
the adequate functioning of its solidarity mechanisms (Gottret and Schieber, 2006). Securing the 
contribution of the self-employed is especially critical in contexts where fiscal evasion is 
common and the informal sector is large.  
Healthcare coverage of the self-employed is challenging because legal coverage is 
voluntary in many countries and because self-employed workers comprise a highly 
heterogeneous group. Some self-employed are not able to afford insurance premiums, while 
others are not willing to contribute a significant percentage of their incomes to finance social 
health insurance schemes that do not meet their priority needs. Other self-employed workers 
enroll in private health insurance schemes instead of public schemes—although this phenomenon 
is observed mainly among high-income individuals in the formal sector.  
In Latin America, self-employed have full mandatory coverage only in Colombia and 
Costa Rica (Mesa-Lago, 2007), while many other countries (México, Chile, Argentina among 
others are following that path). However, even when self-employed enrolment is compulsory, 
enforcement is still a challenge. Colombia was a pioneer in the introduction of mandatory social 
health insurance with its 1993 health reform law and since then, this reform has been seen as a 
paradigm in Latin America and many articles have focused on the analysis of its different aspects 
and implications (see for instance Jaramillo, 2002; Trujillo, 2003; Rodríguez-Monguío and 
Infante Campos, 2004, Castano and Zambrano, 2006, Ruiz et.al, 2007). However, the literature 
on Colombia´s health reform has barely focused on the self-employed, despite that self-
employment represent a large proportion of the working population and their contribution is a 
key step in guaranteeing the financial viability of the system. The two only papers that, to our 
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 A self-employed person is a day or unskilled laborer, an independent professional and independent 
worker of any other type, and employer, or an independent farmer.  
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knowledge, explore the impact of the Colombian health reform on self-employed enrolment 
show an important reduction in financial barriers and higher insurance coverage for the self-
employed (Giedion and Villar-Uribe, 2009; Giota and Garcia-Prado, 2011), still well below the 
established reform goal of achieving 80% coverage among the self-employed. Since these 
studies do not focus on the different categories that compound the self-employed group, we 
believe that some important facts are missing, which in turn, leads us to question previous results 
regarding the effective increase in the self-employed enrolment. 
In this study we focus on the analysis of independent contractors2, a type of self-
employment status that has been widely used by employers to add flexibility to the labor market 
and reduce labor costs (ILO, 2011). This group experienced an exponential growth after the 1993 
health reform law, in the form of worker cooperatives (Cooperativas de Trabajo Asociado), 
growing by more than thirty times between 1993 and 2003 (Confecoop, 2009). Worker 
cooperatives are non-profit ventures formed by a group of individuals who provide labor services 
to companies. As independent contractors, they are not employees from a legal standpoint, and 
consequently they are excluded from the application of labor laws. Although they were created 
as a mechanism to add flexibility in the labor market through outsourcing and sub-contracting 
(Farne, 2008), worker cooperatives have been pointed as an important source of contribution 
evasion through disguised employment relationships. Many companies pushed their workers off 
the books, implying a reclassification from private or public employment to self-employment 
(Salazar et al., 2001). 
We believe that the boom in independent contracting might mask the real effect of the 
1993 healthcare reform on self-employed insurance coverage found in previous studies. For 
instance, if companies pushed their more expensive workers off the books, the insurance 
coverage rate of independent contractors would be larger because reclassified workers are more 
likely to keep their mandatory insurance. In that case, insurance coverage would be upward 
biased due to a sample selection effect rather than the healthcare reform effect. Moreover, the 
increased health insurance coverage of independent contractors could be the result of a change in 
the composition of the group rather than a change in their willingness to opt for coverage. A 
change in the composition or characteristics of independent contractors could be linked to the 
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 An independent contractor is a natural person, business, or corporation that provides goods or services 
to another entity under terms specified in a contract. 
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reclassification of workers from private or public employees to independent contracting. Only a 
change in their willingness to opt for insurance coverage could be associated to effects of the 
healthcare reform. To our knowledge this is the first study that recognizes and corrects for 
potential biases produced by the dramatic growth of worker cooperatives. 
We use household data from 1997 and 2003. Although the healthcare reform law was 
enacted in 1993, different regulations affecting the self-employed passed within the period of 
study. The reform goal was to affiliate 80% of self-employed by 2000, but the target was not 
reached despite the legal mandatory coverage and the subsidies for poor and low-income self-
employed. Evasion in the contributory regime was identified as one of the main challenges of the 
reform. Of the total evasion estimated in 2000, 43.3% resulted from enrollee evasion in the 
contributory scheme (Salazar et al., 2001; Rodríguez-Monguío and Infante Campos, 2004). 
Consequently, between 2000 and 2003 the Colombian government launched a set of measures 
and regulations targeted to reduce evasion from the self-employed. We quantify the effect of 
those measures on health insurance coverage of independent contractors. Our methodology 
corrects for sample selection, and decomposes the change in health insurance coverage into 
changes attributed to the reform and to the characteristics of independent contractors. 
This article contributes to an extensive debate in the literature on how to expand social 
security coverage, and in particular, on how to incorporate the self-employed (Mesa-Lago 2008).  
Social health insurance schemes have been criticized for the difficulty in attracting the self-
employed while, at the same time, have been implemented with the main purpose of reducing 
informality and the uninsured population.  
Our results are not only relevant for Colombia. Many other countries in Latin America 
are facing reforms to introduce mandatory health coverage, and all share the difficulties to 
increase self-employed affiliation. On the other hand, the growth of worker cooperatives is 
common to other Latin American countries such as Argentina, Peru, Chile and Brasil (ILO, 
2005b), and should be considered when analyzing the real impact of reforms on self-employed 
health coverage. Addressing the interaction of the labor market with the health reform, as well 
as, accounting for the heterogeneity within the self-employed group are the main contributions of 
this paper to the literature on health insurance reforms in developing countries.  
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2. The Colombian Health Sector Reform 
Prior to the 1993 health sector reform, Colombia had a healthcare system divided into 
three different sub-systems: the Ministry of Health, the social security institute, and the private 
sector (Londoño and Frenk, 1997). Individuals covered by a healthcare plan were either those 
employees whose companies/public institutions paid part of their contribution (social security) or 
individuals who paid for private insurance. About 15% of the population was covered by social 
security, and 15% had private insurance (Zukin, 1985). The rest of the population resorted to the 
services of the public health system, which provided free or low-cost care in institutions financed 
by the government.  
In December 1993, Colombia passed Law 100 that established universal health insurance 
coverage. In the new system, all Colombians are entitled to choose a health insurer, and they 
have the right to access a standard package of healthcare services. In order to achieve universal 
coverage, the mandatory contributory scheme is combined with a subsidized plan. Coverage 
under the subsidized plan is more limited than it is under the contributory scheme. The 
subsidized plan covers those unable to contribute, who are selected based on a proxy-means test. 
Participation in the contributory scheme is mandatory for all workers. This includes public and 
private sector employees, as well as self-employed individuals who earn more than two times the 
minimum monthly wage. Workers become members of the contributory scheme by enrolling in 
one of the Health Promotion Entities (HPEs). HPE affiliation is contingent upon the payment of 
a monthly contribution equal to 12.5% of wage income, shared between employer (8.5%) and 
employee (4%). One percent of this contribution is directed to the financing of the subsidized 
plan.  
Coverage increased dramatically during the early years of the reform process, growing 
from 15.7% of the population in 1990 to 57% in 1997 (Ruiz et al., 2007). This expansion was 
mainly due to the enrollment of new family members in the contributory scheme and the 
coverage of the poor in the subsidized plan. By the year 2000, roughly half of the population was 
covered, either by the contributory scheme or the subsidized plan (Castano and Zambrano, 
2006). 
However, one of the main challenges of the reform was the coverage of self-employed 
workers characterized by low participation and contribution evasion. Although health insurance 
participation was mandatory in Colombia, enforcement capacity was very limited and incentives 
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for evasion were large. Compared to salaried workers who share their wage contribution to HPE 
with employees, self-employed individuals are required to pay the entire contribution. This 
created incentives to either evade the contributory regime or under report wages to fraudulently 
enroll in the subsidized regime. A major source of contribution evasion was the shift from 
private and public employment to independent contracting (Salazar et al., 2001). Although 
accurate statistics are not available, a survey from 2007 found that nearly 20% of self-employed 
worked as independent contractors, while the remaining 80% worked as own-account workers
3
 
(ref: boletin 11). Independent contracting grew rapidly in Colombia after its 1993 health reform 
law, through the creation of worker cooperatives (CTA, Cooperativas de Trabajo Asociado). The 
raise on the pension and health contributions contemplated by the 1993 health reform produced a 
boom in the number of CTAs. Between 1993 and 2003 the number of CTAs created each year 
grew by more than thirty times (Confecoop, 2009). In particular, from 2000 and 2003 CTAs 
increased dramatically after law 617 of 2000, which openly promoted the creation of CTAs by 
the government, municipalities and public companies, in order to rationalize public spending 
(Farné, 2008). 
In response to these problems, between 2000 and 2003 the Colombian government 
launched a set of measures to control disguised employment through worker cooperatives as well 
as other opportunistic responses to the 1993 health reform law. Thus, in 2002 and 2003, Decree 
1703 and Law 797 were approved, respectively. In Colombia, public and private employers were 
required to demand proof of enrollment in social health insurance for any self-employed worker 
they may hire before the signing of a contractual agreement. Decree 1703 formed the basis of a 
system of sanctions for employers who hire uninsured independent contractors. At the same 
time, Decree 1703 promoted group enrollment for self-employed individuals who are members 
of authorized worker cooperatives. Finally, Law 797 of 2003 (and its Decree 510 of the same 
year) stipulated that the pension system and the contributory scheme had to share a common 
income base. These regulations were coupled with the strengthening of supervision and 
monitoring mechanisms to detect fraudulent membership in the subsidized plan.  
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 Own-account workers are those workers who, working on their own account or with one or more 
partners, hold the type of jobs defined as a self-employment jobs. They include diverse groups from 
carpenters, plumbers, electricians, artisans, farmers; to consultants, lawyers, engineers, architects, 
accountants, pharmacists. 
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3. Empirical Specification 
Demand for health insurance can be modeled as the discrete choice between enrolling in 
the social health insurance scheme or not enrolling (Cameron et al., 1988), because despite the 
mandatory character of the insurance, there are still many people who do not comply with the 
law, and the government lacks the necessary mechanisms to enforce universal coverage.  
Like Bertranou (1998) and Trujillo (2003), we assume that the integration over individual 
health status can be written linearly, so that the function for the enrollment (ENR) of independent 
contractors in the health insurance scheme can be represented by the following equation: 
ENR = 1 if ENR* > 0 and 0 otherwise 
where 
ENR* = β1H+ β2X + ε 
We adopt a latent dependent variable approach in the modeling of the enrollment 
decision where ENR* is positive only if the independent contractor is enrolled in the social 
health insurance scheme. The enrollment equation is a function of self-reported health status (H), 
and individual characteristics (X), which include health status, socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics, household characteristics, and community factors; and an error term (ε). This 
model permits us to evaluate selection by health status by examining the sign of the coefficient 
β1. 
 As we explained before, during the health reform, many private and public organizations 
pushed their workers off the books to independent contracting in order to avoid the higher 
employer payments to health and pensions contemplated in the 1993 law. Reclassification from 
private or public employment to independent contracting may create a sample selection problem 
that must be taken into account in order to correct for potential biases when the impact of the 
health reform is evaluated. We model selection into independent contracting as follows: 
 
INDP= 1 if INDP*>0 and 0 otherwise 
Where 
INDP* = γX1 + µ 
 
The selection equation is a function of self-reported health status and individual 
characteristics (X1) that include an exclusion restriction for identification. Because the selection 
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variable (INDP) and the response variable (ENR) are binaries, we correct by sample selection 
using the approach of Van de Ven and Van Pragg (1981), which assume that error terms ε and µ 
follow a bivariate probit distribution with correlation ρ. The model is estimated by MLE and the 
estimate of ρ is used to test for sample selection.  
We evaluate the change of independent contractor insurance enrollment between 1997 
and 2003. As explained before, the characteristics of independent contractors could have 
changed within that period because of the change in working status from employment in private 
and public companies to self-employment in worker cooperatives; and also because Colombia 
implemented social protection programs that may have improved education, health status and 
income. Improvements in socioeconomic characteristics are associated with higher insurance 
coverage, and consequently changes in insurance enrollment could be driven by the health 
reform and by changes in individual characteristics.  We use the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
applied to probit estimations (Yun, 2003), to quantify how much of the change in insurance 
enrollment was associated to changes in individual characteristics (endowment effect), and to 
changes in the effect of individual characteristics on insurance enrollment (coefficient effect). 
Because we correct by sample selection, the coefficient effect will be associated to the effect of 
the health reform. 
 
4. Data and Variables 
We employ two National Surveys of Quality of Life (NSQL) carried out in Colombia in 
1997 and 2003. These surveys follow the Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) 
methodology implemented by the World Bank. They include a set of questions on the presence 
of chronic conditions, self-reported health status, and the socio-demographic characteristics of 
respondents. The unit of analysis is the individual. 
Because of large heterogeneity of self-employed workers, we limit our analysis to those 
individuals who 1) defined themselves as independent workers, farmers, independent 
professionals and employers; and 2) who work for a company with 2 or more employees. That 
way, we eliminate most of own-account workers (carpenters, plumbers, artisans, consultants, 
lawyers, architects, accountants, etc.), and focus on independent contractors who were the most 
dynamic group in the period of study as a result of the boom of worker cooperatives. This sample 
includes 2,853 independent contractors in 1997 and 5,531 in 2003. We also exclude individuals 
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18 years old or older (3.4% of the sample in 1997 and 1.9% in 2003), and without complete 
observations (2.4% in 1997 and 1.9% in 2003). Our final sample of independent contractors 
consists of 2,661 observations in 1997 and 5,296 observations in 2003. 
Our hypothesis on sample selection is based on the fact that many workers in private and 
public organizations were pushed off the books to independent contracting. To test and correct 
for sample selection we estimate the choice between independent contracting and public and 
private employment. For the sample selection estimation we add a sample consisting of 5,017 
private and public workers in 1997 and 15,814 in 2003. We also exclude individuals 18 years old 
or older (3.1% of the sample in 1997 and 2.3% in 2003), and without complete observations 
(0.02% in 1997 and 0.3% in 2003). Our final sample of private and private workers consists of 
4,859 observations in 1997 and 15,352 in 2003. Table 1 reports weighted averages of the main 
characteristics of independent contractors and private and public workers in the 1997 and 2003 
samples. 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of Individuals by Type of Employment, 1997 and 2003 
Variables 
Independent Contractors   Employed in private sector 
1997 2003 Diff   1997 2003 Diff 
Insured 49.89 61.97 12.08*** 
 
81.63 79.11 -2.52*** 
Individual chronic condition 12.50 16.59 4.09*** 
 
10.34 11.49 1.15* 
Family chronic condition 37.60 40.41 2.81* 
 
35.56 37.75 2.19** 
Self-reported health status 
      
Very good 12.06 10.15 -1.91* 
 
18.58 14.19 -4.39*** 
Good 53.79 54.95 1.16 
 
62.91 67.85 4.94*** 
Average/poor 
f
 34.15 34.91 0.76 
 
18.51 17.96 -0.55 
Age (years) 41.45 42.27 0.83* 
 
34.09 34.94 0.85*** 
Gender (female) 25.50 32.73 7.23*** 
 
43.43 42.40 -1.03 
Marital status 
       
Married 
f
 42.81 40.39 -2.43 
 
33.73 30.66 -3.07*** 
Living together 28.97 30.61 1.63 
 
23.02 25.51 2.49*** 
Widow(er)/divorced 11.06 12.42 1.36 
 
10.41 12.15 1.74** 
Single 17.15 16.59 -0.56 
 
32.84 31.68 -1.16 
Education 
       
No education/primary 
f
 51.28 45.65 -5.63*** 
 
21.96 21.12 -0.84 
Secondary/technical 39.53 38.39 -1.14 
 
59.98 54.36 -5.62*** 
Higher 9.06 15.96 6.9*** 
 
18.00 24.51 6.52*** 
Income (thousand†) 361.86 667.09 305.23*** 
 
559.12 674.58 115.46*** 
Income above limit 24.75 23.21 -1.54 
 
45.91 29.86 -16.06*** 
Unearned income (thousand†) 16.17 18.41 2.24 
 
17.97 11.22 -6.75*** 
SISBEN level 3.26 3.43 0.17*** 
 
4.05 4.00 -5.21** 
SISBEN above limit 70.78 75.39 4.61***  93.33 0.92 -0.88 
Company size 
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2-5 employees 77.65 79.10 1.45 
 
21.18 26.34 5.16*** 
6-49 employees 16.45 12.81 -3.64*** 
 
28.19 28.47 0.28 
50 or more employees 
f
 5.91 8.09 2.19*** 
 
50.63 45.18 -5.44*** 
Urban 68.99 68.32 -0.67 
 
91.09 89.55 -1.54*** 
Family size (number) 4.73 4.57 -0.16** 
 
4.51 4.23 -0.28*** 
Region 
       
Atlantica 20.04 20.56 0.52 
 
17.12 15.28 -1.84** 
Oriental 20.18 19.06 -1.13 
 
14.75 18.88 4.12*** 
Central 10.52 13.47 2.96*** 
 
10.03 9.42 -0.61 
Pacifica 19.00 21.00 2 
 
15.80 17.11 1.31* 
Bogota 16.08 15.74 -0.34 
 
25.91 24.44 -1.47 
Antioquia 12.74 8.56 -4.19*** 
 
14.78 13.37 -1.41* 
San Andres 0.22 0.24 0.02 
 
0.38 0.23 -0.15*** 
Orinoquia 1.23 1.38 0.15 
 
1.24 1.27 0.03 
Source: National Surveys of Quality of Life, 1997 and 2003.  
Weighted averages. Values represent percentages unless otherwise specified. Diff column reports differences and test of 
differences in fractions, or means when it corresponds.  
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 10% 
f reference category,  not included in the regression analysis. 
† In thousands of 2008 Colombian pesos.  
 
Table 1 shows the proportion of insured workers in 1997 and 2003. Between those years, 
the insurance rate of independent contractors jumped from nearly 50% to 62%, while the rate of 
private and public workers fell from 82% to 79%. Both changes are statistically significant and 
motivate our central hypothesis that some private and public organizations pushed off some 
workers (probably the most expensive ones) to independent contracting. 
We also examine adverse selection in health insurance enrollment. We expect that 
independent contractors with chronic conditions or bad health are more likely than healthy 
workers to participate in the national health insurance scheme. We use two types of health binary 
variables in our models: the presence of chronic conditions for the independent contractor and all 
members in the family, and self-reported health status for the independent contractor. Given that 
the Colombian public health insurance system offers family coverage, we expect that the 
probability of enrollment might be affected by the health status of all family members. However, 
for employment selection, we expect that the choice of independent contracting is based on 
individual health status only.   
Other variables used to model the insurance enrollment decision of independent 
contractors include individual demographic characteristics (age, gender, education, and marital 
status), individual enabling factors (monthly income and wealth), household characteristics 
(family size), and community-level factors (urban/rural residence, region of residence). With 
respect to marital status, the desire to purchase health insurance to meet family member needs 
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implies that married individuals will be more likely to participate in the health insurance scheme. 
This is especially true since the contributory plan covers spouses. The same applies to the 
children of the enrollee. A positive relationship between family size and enrollment is, therefore, 
expected. Urban area residents may also be more likely to enroll than rural residents since 
insurers are more developed and easily accessible in urban areas and the government is more 
able to enforce legislation in larger cities. 
We also include categorical variables for company size. In Colombia, companies with 
more than ten employees are considered part of the formal sector. Although we focus on 
independent contractors by restricting our sample to individuals working in companies with more 
than one employee, we hypothesize that self-employed workers in the formal sector would be 
more likely to obtain insurance.  
With respect to individual enabling factors, we include worker’s monthly income and the 
SISBEN level. SISBEN (Selection System of Beneficiaries for Social Programs), is the proxy-
means test designed to provide local governments with a technical tool that could be used for 
targeting social subsidies, including health subsidies, to the most vulnerable members of the 
population. A SISBEN index is calculated using Principal Components Analysis over a set of 
household assets, which provides a prediction of household welfare and poverty level. The index 
was calculated using the 1997 and 2003 survey data (for more details see Velez et al., 1998). 
Based on the score of the index, the household is classified into one of six groups, with SISBEN 
Level 1 being the poorest. According to the Law, individuals who are grouped into SISBEN 
Levels 1 and 2 are eligible to the subsidized plan. On the other hand, self-employed workers who 
earn less than two times the legal minimum monthly wage are also eligible to the subsidized 
plan. We include dummy variables to indicate eligibility based on income and SISBEN. 
An additional variable included only in the selection equation is unearned income. It 
includes remittances, rental income, interest income, and alimony rents. Unearned income and 
chronic conditions are used as exclusion restrictions in sample selection model estimation. As 
explained before, family chronic conditions are used in the enrollment choice and individual 
chronic conditions in the independent contracting selection. 
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5. Results 
Estimation results of the selection equation are presented in Table 2, and results of the 
enrollment equation in Table 3. Sample selection, measured by ρ (the correlation between error 
terms in the selection and enrollment equation), is large, positive and statistically significant only 
in 1997. This indicates that unobserved factors that increase the probability of being independent 
contractor also increase the probability of having health insurance. However, in 2003 sample 
selection becomes not statistically significant, with ρ closer to zero. 
The selection equation in table 2 models the choice of independent contracting in 
companies with two or more employees compared to employment in the private or public sector. 
The drivers of selection of independent contracting are highly consistent in 1997 and 2003. The 
main drivers are age, gender, marital status, education, income, wealth, company size and 
rurality. It is important to highlight the opposite effects of income and wealth. Non-poor 
individuals (SISBEN level 3 or higher) are more likely to be in the private/public formal sector, 
while individuals with wages above the minimum to qualify for the subsidize plan are more 
likely to be independent contractors. 
 
 
Table 2. Selection Equation: Regression for Independent 
Contracting Choice, 1997 and 2003 
Variables 
          Coefficients 
 1997  2003 
Individual chronic condition 
 
-0.13  0.08 
Self-reported health status 
 
 
Very good 
 
0.00  0.01 
Good 
 
0.01  -0.13*** 
Age (years) 
 
0.03***  0.02*** 
Gender (female) 
 
-0.4***  -0.1** 
Marital status 
  
 
 
Living together 
 
-0.19***  -0.09** 
Widow(er)/divorced 
 
-0.14  -0.22*** 
Single 
 
-0.33***  -0.28*** 
Education 
  
 
 
Secondary/technical 
 
0.06  -0.01 
Higher 
 
0.37***  0.14* 
Income (thousand†) 
 
-0.36***  -0.17*** 
Income above limit 
 
0.36***  0.48*** 
Unearned income (thousand†)  0.02*  0.02*** 
SISBEN level 
 
0.00  0.05* 
SISBEN above limit  -0.3***  -0.3*** 
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Company size 
  
 
 
2-5 employees 
 
1.82***  1.58*** 
6-49 employees 
 
0.88***  0.53*** 
Urban 
 
-0.36***  -0.5*** 
Family size (number) 
 
0.01  0.03*** 
ρ  0.68*  -0.04 
Number of (uncensored) observations  7,520  20,648 
Source: National Surveys of Quality of Life, 1997 and 2003.  
Sample selection estimation using bivariate probit. MLE estimation using sample weights and robust 
standard errors.  
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 10% 
† In thousands of 2008 Colombian pesos.  
 
 
The enrollment equation estimation reported in Table 3 models the probability of health 
insurance enrollment adjusted by sample selection. Results are consistent between 1997 and 
2003, but fewer variables are statistically significant in 2003. Family and individual health 
conditions are positive but not statistically significant in either year, which contrasts with other 
studies that found evidence of adverse selection (Panopoulou, 2002). Marital status, education 
and wealth are statistically significant in both years. Higher wealth (SISBEN) is associated to 
higher insurance enrollment, but those with SISBEN level 3 or higher (those who do not qualify 
for the subsidize plan) are less likely to have health insurance. 
 
 
Table 3. Enrollment Equation: Regression for Health Insurance 
Choice of Independent Contractors, 1997 and 2003 
Variables 
          Coefficients 
 1997  2003 
Family chronic condition 
 
0.06  0.06 
Self-reported health status 
 
 
Very good 
 
0.03  0.17 
Good 
 
0.06  -0.08 
Age (years) 
 
0.01***  0.01 
Gender (female) 
 
0.11  0.24*** 
Marital status 
  
 
 
Living together 
 
-0.3***  -0.08 
Widow(er)/divorced 
 
-0.4***  -0.37*** 
Single 
 
-0.61***  -0.3** 
Education 
  
 
 
Secondary/technical 
 
-0.25***  -0.2** 
Higher 
 
0.16  -0.23* 
Income (thousand†) 
 
-0.16***  -0.05 
Income above limit 
 
0.18*  -0.02 
SISBEN level 
 
0.5***  0.58*** 
SISBEN above limit  -0.51***  -0.25* 
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Company size 
  
 
 
2-5 employees 
 
0.69*  -0.22 
6-49 employees 
 
0.23  -0.06 
Urban 
 
-0.24***  -0.06 
Family size (number) 
 
0.06***  0.03 
Number of (uncensored) observations  2,661  5,296 
Source: National Surveys of Quality of Life, 1997 and 2003.  
Sample selection estimation using bivariate probit. MLE estimation using sample weights and robust 
standard errors.  
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 10% 
† In thousands of 2008 Colombian pesos. † In thousands of 2008 Colombian pesos.  
 
 
 
Table 4 reports the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. The columns present the 
decomposition with and without adjustment by sample selection. Since sample selection was 
only significant in 1997 (see table 2 and related discussion above), the differences between 
unadjusted and adjusted decomposition is mostly explained by the enrollment rate of 1997. For 
that year, the rate is nearly 50% based on unadjusted numbers, but around 35% when adjusted by 
sample selection. Sample selection upward biased the insurance rate among independent workers 
in 1997 because for many the factors explaining their enrolment to health insurance also 
explained their employment condition. This was not the case in 2003, when sample selection was 
not statistically significant. 
 
Table 4: Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition 
 
Sample selection adjustment 
 
Unadjusted Adjusted 
1997 Enrollment 0.50*** 0.35*** 
2003 Enrollment 0.62*** 0.63*** 
Difference 0.12*** 0.28* 
Endowments 0.03*** 0.02** 
Coefficients 0.09*** 0.25* 
Interaction 0.00 0.01 
Source: National Surveys of Quality of Life, 1997 and 2003.  
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition applied to probit estimations. Sample 
selection estimation using bivariate probit. Estimations using sample 
weights and robust standard errors. 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 10% 
† In thousands of 2008 Colombian pesos. 
 
When corrected by sample section, the insurance rate among independent contractors 
increased 28 percentage points. Of this, 25 percentage points (nearly 90%) was explained by the 
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health reform, interpreted by coefficient changes in the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. Only 2 
percentage points were attributed to change in the characteristics of independent contractors 
(endowments). Without risk adjustment, the relevance of the reform in the decomposition of 
enrollment change remains. 
 
6. Discussion and Policy Implications 
The few papers that have paid attention to the effect of mandatory health insurance 
reform in Colombia on self-employed enrollment, find that the 1993 health reform was a success 
in terms of increasing their affiliation (Giedion, 2009, Panopoulou and García Prado, 2008). In 
this paper, we show that, when selection bias is having into account and the self-employed 
category is disaggregated, the impact of the mandatory health insurance on self-employed 
affiliation is lower than in previous studies. Our findings support the hypothesis that in the early 
years of the Colombian Health care reform, private and public employers used worker 
cooperatives as a mechanism to push covered employees off the books to independent 
contracting. As a result, the increase on insured self-employed cannot be attributed only to the 
1993 health reform. Former employees, who were reclassified as independent contractors and 
kept their insurance, account for an important fraction of the increase in coverage.  Insurance 
enrolment was then caused not only by the healthcare reform but also by flaws in the labor 
regime that incentivized disguised employment. We estimate that enrollment of independent 
contractors in 1997 was only 35% (compared to 50%) after adjusting by this labor effect. 
 
In response to the opportunistic behaviors that arise as a result of the 1993 reform, the 
government of Colombia approved and implemented new legislations accompany by stringent 
monitoring and supervision mechanisms during the period 1997-2003. Such measures seem to 
have been effective since, in comparison to the results found in 1997, the sample selection due to 
disguised employment was not statistically significant in 2003, right after these policies were 
implemented. In particular, decree 1703 put pressure on employers to ensure self-employed 
worker participation through sanctions, and also encouraged group affiliation of self-employed 
workers who were members of authorized group cooperatives, thus introducing incentives to 
increase and control enrollment of self-employed workers.  
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The Colombian experience provides some important lessons to other countries that are 
undergoing changes to increase the coverage of self-employed while fighting against informality. 
First, the establishment of a mandatory health insurance scheme does not automatically lead to 
enrollment of the total population and much less the self-employed. We find that the healthcare 
reform had a moderate but still significant impact on enrollment of independent contractors. 
Between 1997 and 2003, enrollment increased in 28 percentage points reaching an insurance rate 
of 62%, still below the reform goal of 80%. However, nearly 90% of this increment in 
enrollment was linked to the healthcare reform. Second, embedded within mandatory health 
insurance there are perverse incentives affecting firms and individuals that may limit the impact 
of the reform and needs to be accounted for. While in the Colombian case, one of the 
opportunistic responses was the transfer of workers to work cooperatives so as to avoid the 
higher costs linked to enrollment, other types of opportunistic responses have been found in 
other countries. In the US, it is remarkable the case of Hawaii, where the approval of the 
Hawaiis´s Prepaid Health Care Act led to the transfer of many workers from full-time jobs to 
part-time jobs as a way to avoid mandatory health insurance (Buchmueller et al, 2011), or the 
case of Massachusetts, where smaller firms had incentives to discontinue health insurance so that 
their employees can sign up for cheaper state-subsidized care (Gruber, 2008). Third, strategies to 
increase coverage of the self-employed must consider the high heterogeneity within this group, 
and consider that the reform may have different impacts and challenges in different categories of 
self-employment. In this study we focused on worker cooperatives, whose dramatic growth have 
been observed in other Latin American countries such as Argentina, Peru, Chile and Brasil (ILO, 
2005b). Finally, the Colombian experience, and this paper in particular, show that expanding 
insurance coverage could be unintended affected by other reforms implemented in the country, in 
particular labor and pension reforms, which should be taken into account when assessing and 
designing policies related to health insurance coverage. Some recent papers have focused on this 
interaction during the latest social protection reforms that took place in Colombia in 2007 to find 
that these reforms created incentives to push workers to informality and self-employment 
(Camacho et al, 2008).  While the first wave of reforms made mandatory health insurance 
participation untied to pension contributions, in 2007, there was a second wave of regulations 
that linked health and pension payment system. This policy made impossible to contribute only 
to one of the systems, which may have forced many independent workers with health coverage to 
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stop contributing for health insurance to avoid additional contributions for pension benefits 
(Calderón-Mejía and Marinescu, 2011). Future research should assess the fraction of health 
insurance coverage attributed to the different measures undertaken by the Colombian 
government after 2003. 
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